It has been observed that upon trading-off the costs and benefits of pollution control, profit-maximizing firms may choose not to invest their resources in pollution abatement since the expected penalty imposed by regulators falls considerably short of the investment cost. Regulators have recently embarked on a deliberate strategy to release information to markets (investors and consumers) regarding firms' environmental performance in order to enhance incentives for pollution control. In this paper, we analyze the role that capital markets may play to create such incentives. Evidence drawn from American and Canadian studies indicates that capital markets react to the release of information, and that large polluters are affected more significantly from such release than smaller polluters. This result appears to be a function of the regulator's willingness to undertake strong enforcement actions as well as the possibility for capital markets to rank and compare firms with respect to their environmental performance.
In several of the countries studied here, 5 the monitoring problem is compounded by weak enforcement. In short, when violators of standards are detected, if penalised at all they often face only weak sanctions. (...) polluters are exempted from fines either on grounds of financial hardship or because the violators wield undue political influence. Perhaps the most pervasive problem is that, even when fines are levied, they are frequently so low in real terms that they have little if any deterrent value. (p. 94) 6 More recently, the USEPA found that some of the largest industrial states may not be enforcing federal laws governing air and water pollution:
Environmental Protection Agency officials say they have found that Pennsylvania and some other big industrial states are reporting only a handful of major pollution violations, suggesting that inspectors in those states may be turning a blind eye to pollution problems. (New York Times, December 15, 1996) If indeed the expected penalty for non-compliance, as imposed by environmental regulators and courts were so low, one would have difficulties to explain the generally high level of compliance with regulation in developed countries, and the very large variance in the environmental performance of plants in developing countries. Hence there must be other incentives than those provided by regulators and courts that could explain a polluter's environmental performance. As such, the potential role and impact of local communities and markets (including consumers and investors) are the object of increasing scrutiny.
7 Once the role and potential impact of these agents are properly acknowledged, once the conditions under which the action of these agents may be effective are identified, fines and penalties imposed by regulators and courts may not appear to be in many circumstances the most appropriate or effective incentives for pollution control. In fact, the USEPA has recently pointed out that "EPA's job should grow from primarily the "enforcer" to include greater emphasis on helping citizens make informed choices in their daily lives" (EPA, 1991, p.2) .
Hence, while there is a growing concern that fines and penalties imposed on agents out of compliance are not severe enough to have a deterrence effect, 8 some authors have challenged the conclusion that polluters therefore have no incentives to comply with environmental standards. In particular, in view of the increasing facility of access and exchange of information, markets (both consumers and investors) bear an increasing amount of attention as to their capacity to generate incentives for pollution control. 9 A significant amount of research and experiments remain to be performed in order to identify the circumstances under which the activities of these agents may be effective, the conditions under which the incentives they generate may substitute for or complement "typical enforcement practices", and the proper role of the regulator to empower these agents. In this paper, our purpose is to discuss and examine how investors have reacted to the release of public information regarding the environmental performance of specific plants, as observed and measured by fluctuations on the stock market. 10 While some of this information is revealed through regular coverage by newspapers, it also includes a deliberate use and release of information by regulators regarding the environmental performance of individual plants.
In the next section, we discuss the nature of the role of capital markets with respect to providing incentives for pollution control. In section III, we briefly describe the methodology typically used to measure the reaction of investors to the release of environmental information.
In section IV, we review the results of the studies that have examined the reaction of investors to the announcement of environmental incidents (such as lawsuits, fines, accidents, etc.), or list of polluters (e.g. Toxics Release Inventory). We also present the results of a new study that examines the reaction of investors to the publication of lists of firms in British Columbia that either fail to comply with environmental regulations or that are of concern to the Ministry of the Environment of British Columbia. We conclude in section V. Given the number of convictions, average penalties increased from $ 9 330 to $ 14 250.
II. THE ROLE OF CAPITAL MARKETS
Despite the increase (as noted by Saxe, 1989) , fines remain low. In British Columbia, 79
convictions were obtained over the period April 1 -September 30, 1992; average fines were then slightly less than $ 3 000. 12 More recently, over the period October 1 1995 to March 30 1996, total fines of $ 219 200 were levied in British Columbia on 116 convictions for an average of less than $ 2 000 (the maximum fine was $ 20 000 and there were 59 fines of $ 500 or smaller). Criminal actions, in which the regulator typically seeks imprisonment of the defendant(s), remain rare events.
Given the small size of those penalties, markets are more likely to revise their estimates of the present value of a firm only to the extent that the information leads them to revise their expectations regarding future production costs (including the pollution control costs) or the ability of the firm to generate revenues at the levels originally expected. It is interesting to note that this information may concern solely a given enterprise or may directly or indirectly allow a comparison of the environmental performance of an enterprise to the performance of other firms (such as lists of firms ranked in one way or another by their environmental performance).
Information of both nature, which we may call individual information and collective information respectively, may affect expectations regarding production costs and revenues.
However, we would argue that individual information is more likely to have a relatively larger impact on expectations of production costs (as opposed to revenues), while collective information is more likely to have a larger impact on expectations of revenues (as opposed to production costs).
Indeed, in most cases individual information takes the form of an announcement of an event that is generally not favourable to the enterprise such as a violation of regulation, the announcement of an incident causing damages to the environment (such as a spill), the announcement of a lawsuit against the enterprise, etc. As mentioned earlier, given the size of the penalties imposed by courts and regulators, it is unlikely upon such an announcement, that changes in market values, if any, would solely reflect expectations regarding the size of a potential penalty. These changes are more likely to reflect expectations that the firm may be the target of closer scrutiny and further enforcement actions, that citizens and community groups may pressure the firm to reduce its emissions (even below environmental standards), and as a result that it may have to invest large resources (financial and others, e.g. time) in pollution control. We would therefore expect changes in market value, if any, to be larger (potentially much larger) than traditional penalties imposed by courts and regulators. 13 A further question of interest therefore is whether or not these large observed changes in market value, caused by the provision of new information, provide enough incentives for investments in pollution control.
While individual information may also lead consumer groups to boycott the good(s)
produced by the enterprise, thus leading to a revision of the expectations on future revenues, the degree of substitution that is taking place may be limited due to the absence of information regarding the environmental performance of other enterprises. On the contrary, collective information which compares firms with bad performance to those with good performance is more likely to allow this substitution to take place since it gives an alternative to those consumers who wants to substitute away from the firms with a bad environmental performance. Moreover, since pollution efficiency is often associated to overall production efficiency, 14 collective information indirectly (and perhaps imperfectly) allows a comparison of the overall efficiency of the enterprise. This explains why we expect collective information to have a greater impact on expectations of future revenues than individual information.
Whether or not markets react to the release of new information regarding the environmental performance of firms (whether individual or collective information) remains ultimately an empirical issue. In the next section, we briefly discuss the methodology used to measure market reactions. In section IV, we present a number of empirical studies and discuss the results of those studies in view of the hypotheses developed above.
III. EVENT-STUDY METHODOLOGY
The methodology used in this field of research is akin to event-study analyses which is based on the assumption that the capital market is sufficiently efficient to evaluate the impact of new information (events) on expected future profits of the firms. 15 The reaction to the announcement of an event is obtained by predicting a "normal" return for each firm during an "event window" (usually the day prior to the event, the day of the event, and a number of days after the event), and then subtracting this predicted normal return from the actual return observed on those days following the announcement of the event. Normal returns are generated by estimating a version of the Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM):
where R it is the rate of return on security i for day t; R ft is the rate of return on a risk-free asset;
R mt is the rate of return of a market index (such as the Dow Jones market index); β ι is the estimated parameter; and e it is the error term for security i on day t. The CAPM model is estimated for each firm over a number of days before the event window (usually between 120
and 210 days).
In absence of unexpected information, the relationship between the firm's return, the market's return and the return of the risk-free asset should be unchanged. Hence, these returns can be used to forecast the normal return for the firm. A prediction error is generated when unexpected information affects the return for the firm without affecting the market's return and the risk-free asset's rate of return. The prediction error, commonly referred to as the abnormal return (AR) for security i at time t (AR it ), is computed as the following:
The day the event is announced is referred to as day 0, and all other days are measured relative to day 0. The average abnormal return is then computed across firms:
where N t is the number of securities in a given subsample. A statistical test (t-test) is then used to determine the level of significance of abnormal returns for a given subsample. The test uses the estimated standard error of the returns computed for the estimation period:
where $( ) s AAR t is the estimated standard error of abnormal returns during the estimation period.
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSES
Following these lines of argument, a number of papers have investigated, using the event-study methodology, how capital markets can provide incentives for pollution control. between 1977 and 1986. The event-study results indicate that stockholders suffer on average a statistically significant loss of 1.2 percent in market value at the filing of the lawsuit, with no significant abnormal returns at the disposition of the suit. Interestingly, they compute that the abnormal losses due to announcements of lawsuits translate into an average loss of 33.3 million $ in equity value. Given the small penalties typically imposed by courts and regulators, this result confirms our hypothesis that losses of market value, if any, are likely to be significantly larger than the traditional penalties. Lanoie and Laplante (1994) perform a similar analysis with 9 announcements of lawsuits and 13 announcements of suit settlements in Canada during the period 1982-1991. Interestingly, they find results that contrast with those of Muoghalu et al.; i.e., they observe abnormal losses between 1.65% and 2% when the firm is found guilty (and fines are imposed), but no losses when lawsuits are initiated. This difference may be due to the conciliating approach that Canadian environmental authorities have traditionally adopted in comparison with their American counterparts (see Marchant, 1990) . As pointed out earlier, it is also interesting to note that the recovery of economic benefits realised as a result of non-compliance is not a common practice in Canada while it is explicitly incorporated in the assessment of penalties in the United States. The fact that Canadian shareholders do not react to the announcement of lawsuits may indicate little or no worry as to the outcome of the legal procedure, while American environmental authorities seem to have been more successful in designing enforcement mechanisms in which a lawsuit can impose a credible threat on investors. Note that the information used in these two studies would classify as individual information.
In contrast with the preceding research, two studies have analysed the deliberate provision of information to the markets (by regulators or third parties), and its impact on firms'
value. This information is based on rankings of polluters and can thus be qualified as collective information. Shane and Spicer (1983) use studies conducted by the Council of Economic Priorities (CEP) of firms' environmental performance in four industries (paper, power, steel, and oil) to analyse the reaction of investors to the release of the results of those studies. They examine eight studies released by the CEP between 1970 and 1975. They find that firms' market value is adversely affected by the release of this information. Perhaps more interestingly, they also find that firms identified as serious polluters suffered greater loss of market value than those with a better ranking. Given these results, these authors conclude that investors use the information to discriminate between companies on the basis of their environmental performance records. Hamilton (1995) The event-study conducted by Hamilton is based on a sample of 436 enterprises reporting TRI pollution figures. Unsurprisingly, most of these enterprises (75% of the sample) are in the manufacturing sector (chemicals, paper, primary metals, petroleum and textiles) with 12% in the chemical industry. Results show that these firms experienced negative, statistically significant abnormal returns between 0.2 and 0.3 % upon the first release of the information. These abnormal returns translated into an average loss of $4.1 million in stock value on the day the pollution figures were released, with firms in the primary metals industry experiencing a smaller loss of market value (presumably because these firms were already perceived as large polluters by the market). He also find that the larger the number of chemicals a firm reported to produce or handle at its facilities, the larger the loss the firm suffered in its market value: for each additional chemical, Hamilton measures a loss of $236,000. 17 
New results
Since July 1990, every six months or so the Ministry of the Environment of British Columbia (BC, Canada) publishes a list of polluters identified into two categories: (1) firms that are currently not complying with an environmental standard or permit; and (2) firms that are of concern to the Ministry because their environmental performance is near the regulatory threshold, or because their level of pollution is abnormally high in a sector of activity which is not regulated. Since these lists do not provide a ranking of enterprises, and do not allow for a comparison of their environmental performance, we classify this information as individual information.
In the following, we examine the impact of the first five lists of polluters on the equity value of firms appearing on these lists. Our analysis complement that of Hamilton (1995) in two different ways: (1) it is based on a Canadian list providing a different set of informations than those released in the TRI; and (2) we investigate how investors treat the information about firms appearing successively on more than one list, while Hamilton focused exclusively on the first release of the TRI. We first look at the whole sample of firms appearing on each list. Then, we examine more specifically the firms that are of concern versus those that are out-of-compliance, and the firms that have appeared once on a given list versus those that have appeared several times.
Finally, to investigate how investors react to successive appearances on different lists, we perform an analysis in which only firms that appeared on all lists (whether being of concern or out-of compliance) are considered. Hamilton (1995) and Shane and Spicer (1983) , this suggests that appearing on the BC polluters' list has no impact on a firm's equity value. A number of reasons may explain this result. First, it may be that BC's lists of polluters do not provide new or unexpected information to investors. Canada is a much smaller market than the United States, with only a very few large public enterprises. The first release of the TRI provided a set of detailed information on releases of a large number of severe pollutants, information more likely to be unknown to the investors than that provided by the BC list.
Moreover, it is important to note that in any given list, the Ministry of the Environment does not systematically report all firms out of compliance or of concern ot the Ministry. A firm may be out of compliance (or of concern) and yet never appear on the lists, or appear only after a number of lists have been published: not being listed is not necessarily an indication of good environmental performance. As we have noted before, this feature of the BC's lists of polluters do not allow investors to rank firms according to their environmental performance.
Furthermore, given the characteristics of the economy of British Columbia, unsurprisingly the companies listed in BC's lists are mostly in the primary sector (resources) of the economy; therefore, any potential decline in demand resulting from an adversarial reputation effect may be less important than in Hamilton's sample which covered firms in a broader set of activities.
Finally, investors may believe that appearing on BC's lists does not represent any significant threat for the companies involved. Given our earlier discussion, the difference between the American results and those presented here may again indicate that American environmental authorities have been more successful in designing policy mechanisms that create a credible threat for firms. Table 3a and Table 3b provide a more detailed analysis in which different categories of firms are distinguished. In Table 3a , firms that are out-of-compliance and those that are of concern are analyzed separately. One could expect that firms out of compliance would be under a more important threat than those of concern. On the other hand, the fact that firms are of concern for the environmental authorities could be new information to the market; this could have more impact on the value of firms reported under this heading. As shown in Table 3a however, no statistically significant abnormal losses can be detected in either category.
In Table 3b , we distinguish between firms that appear once on a given list and those that appear more than once. One would expect that for environmental authorities, the pressure to take actions against a polluter may be "cumulative" so that firms appearing more than once on a given list could experience more important abnormal losses. The results seem to confirm this hypothesis. Indeed, we obtain statistically abnormal losses on day -1 and day +1 for firms appearing more than once on the second list: -0.1 % on day -1 and -1 % on day +1. Such abnormal negative returns for firms appearing several times on the second list may indicate that investors required strong signals about a firm's bad environmental performance before revising the expected value attributed to this firm. Table 4 provides further evidence that investors may have reacted in the way we just described. In this Table, we consider a sample of firms that have appeared on every list so as to investigate how investors handle the information contained in successive appearances on the list. There were two such firms. Again, the only significant abnormal loss appears for the second list on day +1 (a loss of 2 %) suggesting that investors needed strong indications before changing their expectations. No abnormal losses beyond the second list may mean that appearing on the list has a once-for-all effect, and that successive appearance does not provide significant new information. 
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
It has been observed that upon trading-off the costs and benefits of pollution control, profit-maximizing firms may choose not to invest their resources in pollution abatement since the expected penalty imposed by regulators falls considerably short of the investment cost. This however ignores that markets and communities can also create incentives for pollution control to the extent that they possess information regarding a polluter's environmental performance. Regulators have recently embarked on a deliberate strategy to release information to markets (investors and consumers) and communities regarding firms' environmental performance in order to enhance incentives for pollution control.
In this paper, we analyze the role that capital markets may play to create such incentives. Evidence drawn from American and Canadian studies indicates that capital markets react to the release of information, and that large polluters are affected more significantly from such release than smaller polluters. Hence, regulatory agencies can use, in addition to traditional regulatory measures, information-oriented approaches so as to harness the power of communities and markets to put pressure on polluters. This result however appears to be a function of the regulator's willingness to undertake strong enforcement actions (United States Vs Canada), as well as the possibility for capital markets to rank and compare firms with respect to their environmental performance (Council of Economic Priorities and TRI Vs British Columbia's lists of polluters).
Further research in this area will indicate the circumstances under which the release of information can create incentives for pollution control by empowering the agents that can bear pressure on polluters. In particular, current research will indicate whether or not capital markets in developing countries can create incentives for pollution control.
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Further research should also indicate whether or not this information not only has an impact on market valuation, but ultimately whether or not it affects a polluter's environmental performance.
END NOTES

1
We define monitoring as the set of activities aimed at verifying the status of compliance of a specific polluter with the applicable standards; among others, these activities include inspections of a polluter's facilities and sampling (see Magat and Viscusi (1990) for a description of the various types of inspections undertaken by the USEPA). We define enforcement as the set of actions and penalties that can be used by a regulator to penalize non-compliance with the regulation. Monitoring and enforcement together determine the expected penalty of non-compliance with the regulation. A profit-maximizing firm would compare this expected penalty with the expected cost of abating pollution to determine the course of action that maximizes profits.
2 Russell (1990) writes: "What is missing is a commitment of resources to check up on whether those covered by the law and regulations are doing (or not doing) what is required of (or forbidden to) them." (p. 243) 3 See Silverman (1990) and Canada (1992) . Strictly speaking, such a strategy would ignore however that the nature and amount of damages caused by a unit of pollution are in most cases a function of the characteristics of the local environment in which this unit is released. Dion, Lanoie and Laplante (1997) have shown that in fact the potential for environmental damages partly explains the regulator's inspection strategy in the pulp and paper industry in Quebec. Furthermore, along with Deily and Gray (1991, 1996) , they show that monitoring and enforcement activities are also a function of variables such as local labor market conditions (e.g. local unemployment rate), and the visibility of the plant in the local area.
4
See Russell (1990) and Saxe (1989) . Fundamental to the penalty is the recovery of any economic benefit which accrued as the result of the violation of environmental law. The EPA uses a computer model (called BEN) to estimate a violator's economic benefit from avoiding compliance. It is based on an opportunity cost argument: by delaying compliance with the standard, the money that should have been spent on pollution control can be invested on other revenue-generating activities. BEN therefore calculates the difference between the present value of compliance versus non-compliance (see Libber (1991) for more details). It is not clear however that these penalties indeed recover the economic benefits gained by violators (General Accounting Office, 1991) . In Canada, the recovery of economic benefit is not a common practice (see Ontario, 1993). 5 Those being Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Indonesia. 6 While we do not wish to argue that the experience of these East Asian countries is directly comparable and similar to the North American experience, there are nonetheless more similarities than may appear at first glance. For example, Deily and Gray (1991) have found in the US steel industry that plants with a higher probability of closing as a result of having to comply with the environmental regulation are subject to a lesser amount of monitoring and enforcement activities. In other words, for the purpose of monitoring and enforcement, regulators target plants that may have a greater capacity to invest in pollution control or pay the fines and penalties associated with being out of compliance. In Canada, courts have used a number of mitigating factors to justify the imposition of small penalties on polluters violating environmental regulations. These include: the accused is a small company, expressed remorse and desire to avoid similar offenses in the future, has a strong sense of community in which it takes some pride, may have to shut down the factory with a loss of jobs and dire and severe financial consequences to the accused and to its employees, etc. (Canada, 1988) . 8 Russell (1990) writes: "Efforts to monitor regulated behavior appear to have been inadequate to the task -a very difficult task in many instances -and typical enforcement practices appear to have been insufficiently rigorous." (p. 243; italics ours). On the difficulty of the task, see General Accounting Office (1987, 1993, 1994). 9 While the current paper focuses exclusively on the role of information to generate incentives for pollution control, the ever greater easiness of access to information suggests numerous other applications. For example, the medical license board of Massachusetts now gives public access to disciplinary records and malpractice histories of physicians in the state; it has also been suggested that airlines give public access to their safety records: number of crashes, safety violations, etc. (The Economist, January 11, 1997); the Government of Philippines is currently putting in place a rating system to compare and publicly reveal the performance of concessionaires providing water supply to the various quarters of Manila.
10
A related but different question of interest is whether or not firms with good environmental performance have a higher market valuation than plants with bad environmental performance, other things being equal. On analysis of this nature, see Cormier et al. (1993) and the references therein. 
